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TAXATION OF GIFTS IN TRUST TO CHARITIES
RESERVING A LIFE INCOME INTEREST
HERMAN L TRAUTMAN*

I. TAx POLICY CONSIDERATioNs

AND REvENUE RULING 60370:*

The character of every nation is determined in large part by the
values and beliefs of its people. A value high in the mores of American society is a settled policy decision to encourage gifts to charities.
Governmental policy, federal and state, has been implemented for a
long time in various areas of the law by special provisions in favor
of charity; and nowhere has the implementation of this policy been
more pronounced than in our present tax laws, due in no small
part to the high graduated income tax rates applicable to individuals.
In order to encourage charities, Congress has provided that charitable
contributions may be deducted in computing the federal income,1
estate 2 and gift 3 taxes. Also, it has provided that the receipts of
qualified charities are wholly exempt from income taxation. 4 The
intended purpose of both the deductions and the exemption is to
provide a subsidy for philanthropic institutions. 5
Do the provisions for charitable contributions serve merely as a
stimulant to benevolence, or have they been perverted in the hands
of skillful tax manipulators into vehicles for tax avoidance and
private preference? The question has been asked, but neither
answered nor discussed.6 Instead, the suggestion was made that the
"tax reformer" is concerned (a) with whether there should be any
charitable deductions under the tax laws, or whether the public
functions discharged by charities should be undertaken directly by
government and financed, in part at least, by the additional taxes
which would result from denying the deductions, and (b) upon a
more technical level, with whether or not the current law aptly
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Member, Nashville and Tennessee Bars, and American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Committee
on Income of Estates and Trusts.

** 1960 INT. REV. B LL. No. 49, at 15.
1. INT.REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
2. INT.R V.CODE OF 1954, § 2055.
3. INT.Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 2522.
4. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (a). For the tax liability of charities on

unrelated business income, see §§ 511-514.
5. Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base For Individuals, 58 CoLUM. L.
REV. 815, 825-26 (1958), reprinted in 1 HousE COMAMETE ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 86TH CONG., lST SESS., TAx REmION COMPENDIUM 1 (Comm. Print

1959). See also the discussion of the Senate Finance Committee in S. Rm.
No. 1584, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), and S. RE. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1954).
6. Lowndes, Tax Advantages of Charitable Gifts, 46 VA. L. REV. 394, 395
(1960).
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achieves the purposes for which it was designed. 7 The founders of
American philanthropies generally have been "free enterprisers," and
the connection between preserving individual freedom and providing
facilities for helping-people-help-themselves has in the past been
clear. Notwithstanding the suggestion of the tax reformer, agreement
seems to persist in both the public mind and in the Congress that
certain activities are better handled in our society through private
philanthropy than by government or business; and until a way is
found for encouraging private philanthropy which is preferable to
the present use of the tax system for this purpose, the charitable
deduction should not and probably will not be changed. 8 Care is
always needed in taxation, however, to prevent abuse or inequity.
It will be the purpose of this article to examine one facet of charitable giving-a currently popular method-to see if there is implicit
in it a perversion of congressional purpose or policy.
Gifts to charity of assets whose fair market value exceeds the
donor's cost basis have been treated as twice blessed for a long time
by our tax laws. The donor receives a deduction against his ordinary
income for the current fair market value, and he does not have to
report his "unrealized" gain as gross income.9 The Treasury regulation 0 merely provides that the amount of the deduction is determined
by the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution; it does not say that the gift itself is not a realization of that
part of the value which equals the appreciation of the property over
its basis." But taxpayers and the Treasury have long acted as
though this were the unstated consequence of the regulation, 12 and a
7. Ibid.
8. Surrey, supranote 5.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (b) (1) (A) and (B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1
(c) 1958; see also Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331, 335-36 (5th Cir.
1954); W. K. Frank Trust v. Comm'r, 145 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1944); Rev. Rul.
55-410, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 297; SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON
321, 965-972 (1960 ed.).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1958).
11. Compare the principle of Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). Is
it helpful to draw a distinction between gifts of assets in the nature of
ordinary income, e.g., inventory items or assets held for ordinary business
sale, and gifts of assets which would be included in the statutory definition
of capital assets? Compare Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and the
Internal Revenue Code, 65 HARv. L. REV. 84 (1951); Bittker, Charitable Gifts
of Income and the Internal Revenue Code: Another View, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1375 (1952); Griswold, In Brief Reply, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1389 (1952); SuRREY
& WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 970-972 (1960 ed.).
12. Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 297 holds that the satisfaction of
a dollar pledge to a charity by means of a gift of property which has either
appreciated or depreciated in value does not give rise to a taxable gain
or a deductible loss, even though the contribution is deductible to the
extent of the fair market value at the time of the gift.
Special Ruling dated March 12, 1958, CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAX REP.

II

6807 holds that a transfer of appreciated property to a college in trust to
pay the income to the donor for life, then to a secondary beneficiary for
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proposed statutory change limiting the deduction to the donor's cost
was apparently rejected by the Congress in 1938.13 The double
blessing rule has accordingly evolved and been accepted as a proper
implementation of the congressional policy favoring charitable gifts
by lower court decisions, 14 revenue rulings' 5 and texts. 16 It would
seem unlikely that the Treasury would attempt to tax the gift as a
realization of income or to amend the regulation so as to limit the
deduction to cost without congressional permission, 17 and this seems
true despite the fact that much of what Mr. Justice Stone wrote in
the Horst case fits the charitable gift of appreciated property rather
18
precisely.
A completely different congressional tax policy, not at all connected with the policy to encourage the work of charitable institutions, is that which excludes from gross income the interest on
state and local obligations. 19 In 1942 the Treasury Department
life, remainder to the college, does not result in a realization of gain to
the donor.
13. Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Revenue Code,
65 HtARv. L. REV. 84, 92 n. 21 (1951) states that in 1938 a subcommittee recommended a change to limit the deduction to the cost of the donated property,

and this was adopted by the House. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 20 (1938). But the change was rejected by the Senate committee, and
was not enacted. See S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 14 (1938); H.R.
REP. No. 2330 (Conference), 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1938). See also Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1954).
14. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); W. K. Frank Trust
v. Comm'r, 145 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1944); White v. Broderick, 104 F. Supp. 213
(D. Kan. 1952); SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459 (1954); Estate of Farrier, 15 T.C. 277
(1950).
15. Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 297; Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 Cum.
BULL. 223.
16. SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcOiME TAXATIoN 321, 970 (1960 ed.); CCH
1960 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f 1864.432.

17. Bittker, supra note 11, at 1378, n. 14.
18. "The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and

uses the income to procure these satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his
Such a use of his
right to collect it as the means of procuring them ....

economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure a satisfaction which
can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or property, would
seem to be the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfaction is the
purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the payment of his debt there, or
such non-material satisfactions as may result from the payment of a campaign or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 103. It is reported that in June 1958 there were
about $57 billion of such interest-bearing debt outstanding, and that about
40% of these obligations were held by individual investors. SuRRxY &
WARREN, FEDERAL INcomE TAxATION 175

(1960 ed.).

Since the enactment

of P. L. 86-69, the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 801-820, it has been variously reported that life
insurance companies are purchasing tax exempt bonds. An estimate for the
year 1956 places the amount of this interest excluded by individuals at $500
million, involving $200 million in tax, and for corporations (year 1955) at
$400 million and also about $200 million in tax. Pechman, Erosion of the
Individual Income Tax, 10

NAT'L

TAX J. 1, 24 (1957); Hellmuth, Erosion of the

Federal Corporation Income Tax Base, in

JOINT ComirvTEE ON ECONOMIC
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strenuously urged that this statutory exclusion be eliminated so
that all interest on state and local obligations, either outstanding or
to be issued, would be subject to federal income tax. The states
unanimously fought the Treasury proposal. In 1951 the Treasury
again urged unsuccessfully the taxation of the interest accruing on
these obligations. 20 Only recently the exclusion of such interest from
the income tax base was described to the Congress as "indefensible
from the standpoint of income tax policy." 21 The important point
to note for the purpose of this article is that however one may feel
about the exclusion of interest on state and local obligations from the
tax base, it involves a policy question completely separate from the
congressional policy favoring charities.
Out of these two separate and unrelated tax policy decisions, however, there has evolved a dramatic and popular recent method of
giving to charity. Referred to variously as the "Pomona Plan" or
"Tax-Free Life Income Plan," these tax benefits were often advertised
in the leading financial newspapers and magazines22 as follows: (1)
eliminate all tax on capital gain; (2) obtain tax free income for life;
(3) receive 30 per cent contribution credit; (4) reduce your income
tax; (5) have more spendable income; (6) provide income for your
survivor; (7) establish a memorial fund in your name at the college;
and sometimes (8) how to make money by giving it away-to charity.
The essential elements of the plan are (a) the gift of substantially
appreciated property-which frequently provides little or no income
-to a charitable institution, under an arrangement in which the
charity will (b) sell the property for the current market value and
invest the proceeds in tax exempt bonds, (c) pay the income received
to the donor for life, and (d) provide a legal (as distinguished from
an equitable) remainder to the charity. While different kinds of
life income arrangements can be made with various charitable institutions involving annuities and life income contracts,23 the clearest
and most popular plan uses the irrevocable inter-vivos trust concept
REPORT, 84TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PAPERS ON FEDERAL TAX
GROWTH Am STABILITY 888, 893 (Comm. Print 1955).

PoLicy

EcoNonc
20. Sumumy & WARREN, FEDERAL INcOMAE TAXATION 176 (1960 ed.) For a
FOR

presentation of the policy considerations pro and con the taxation of interest
on state and local obligations, see id. at 175-202.
21. Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base For Individuals, in 1 House
COmmITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SEss., TAx REVISION
CoriPENDU 1 (Comm. Print 1959).
22. See for example the advertisements of Pomona College and The University of Notre Dame reprinted in the U.S. News & World Report issue
dated Dec. 28, 1959, at 73 in an article entitled How To Increase Income By
Giving Money to Colleges. The Notre Dame advertisement also appeared in

the Wall Street Journal of March 18, 1960. Many other educational institutions, state and private, have advertised the plan in newspapers,
magazines and brochures.
23. See discussion, infra,pp. 611 to 616.
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with a retained life income interest to the donor. Generally the
transfer is to the university or other charity in trust to pay the
income to the donor for life, or to the donor and his wife for the
life of the survivor, the trust to terminate at the death of the owner
of the income interest, with a legal remainder to the charity. It is
important that the remainder gift i' a legal remainder and not an
equitable remainder in order to qualify for the extra 10 per cent
deduction allowed by section 170 (b) (1) (A) so that a total of 30 per
cent of adjusted gross income can be deducted.2" According to the
Committee Report the additional allowance does not apply to payments to a trust under which a charity otherwise qualifying for such
allowance is a beneficiary. 25
This arrangement and the tax consequences resulting from it may
be illustrated by the following example: Mr. and Mrs. A, ages 49
and 48, have a net taxable income of $36,000 (adjusted gross income
of $41,000). Their federal income tax now totals $12,400 and their
top bracket is 50 per cent. They had intended to make a gift of
$10,000 to the college at the death of the survivor. They have
learned, however, of the economic and social advantages of making
an inter-vivos gift to the college, reserving a joint income interest
which can be made tax exempt, and they have decided to do it. Instead of making a cash gift of $10,000 they transferred appreciated
securities which cost them $5,000 but now have a market value of
$10,000. Because the securities were stocks of growth companies,
the annual dividends were only $150, a gross yield of 3 per cent on
cost and 13 per cent on market, and an after tax yield of 1Y/ per
cent on cost and 3/ of 1 per cent on market value. The securities
are transferred to the college as trustee for the life of the survivor
of Mr. and Mrs. A, remainder to the college. The college, as trustee,
sells the securities for $10,000 and invests that amount in state and
24. Section 170(a) allows as a deduction "any charitable contribution." This
phrase is defined in § 170(c) to mean a contribution or gift "to or for the
use of' a qualified charity. The general limitation on charitable contributions is limited to 20 per cent of adjusted gross income. § 170 (b) (1) (B).
The additional 10 per cent is provided in the special rule of § 170(b) (1) (A)
and this is limited to charitable contributions "to" the qualified charities
specified. Therefore, in order to receive the additional 10 per cent deduction
it is essential that the gift of the remainder interest be "to" the charity, and
not "for the use of" it. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b) (1958). A legal remainder
to the charity is a gift to it, whereas an equitable remainder in trust is a
gift for the use of it. See Note: Equitable Remainder Subject to a Trust
Distinguished From Legal Remainders Subsequent to a Trust, in LEACH,
FuuRaE INTERESTS 157 (2d ed. 1940). See also Special Rulings, March 12,
1958, CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAx REP. ff 6807; February 11, 1959, CCH 1959
STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6356.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A 53 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d

Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (1954) reported in 3 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 83d

2d Sess. 4621 at 4843 (1954). Lowndes states that it is not clear, however, whether this means an income beneficiary or a remainderman. Lowndes, Tax Advantages of Charitable Gifts, 46 VA. L. REv. 394, 419 (1960).
CONG.,
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municipal bonds yielding 4 per cent so that $400 of tax exempt interest is distributed annually by the trustee to the income beneficiaries. What are the advantages of this arrangement?
1. No capital gains tax.-If Mr. and Mrs. A had sold the stock, they
would have been subject to a tax in the amount of $1,250 on their
$5,000 capital gain. By transferring the property itself, however,
there is no capital gains tax. A gift of appreciated property is not a
realization of income, and this is true even though an ordinary income tax deduction is taken for its current market value.26
2. Charitable deduction.-Mr. and Mrs. A will receive a deduction
for the portion of the $10,000 which represents the value of their
present gift to the college. This will be the value of the remainder
interest, determined from actuarial tables to be the sum of $3,638.27
This deduction will save for them the sum of $1,819 which would
otherwise be paid by them as income tax for the current year.
3. The trustee will pay no capital gains tax.-When a transfer of
appreciated property is made by gift, the donee takes the basis of
the donor 28 and this is equally true when the gift is made in trust.
When the trustee sells the appreciated property transferred by Mr.
and Mrs. A, it will accordingly realize a capital gain of $5,000. Unless capital gains realized by the trustee are distributable or in fact
distributed to the income beneficiary under the terms of the trust
instrument or state trust law, however, they are allocated and taxed
to the remainder beneficiary and the tax is paid by the trustee; 29 and
when the remainder beneficiary is a qualified charitable institution, a deduction is allowed to the trustee for the full amount of
the capital gain allocated to corpus. 30 Thus, there will be no income
tax paid by the trustee, and the full amount of the $10,000 received
upon sale of the appreciated property will be preserved intact for
reinvestment in tax exempt bonds.
4. Lower estate taxes.-Because the gift was a transfer with a retained income for life, the value of the trust fund at death must be
included in the gross estate of the spouse who owned the securities.31
Assuming the owner was Mr. A, the inclusion would increase the
amount available for the marital deduction to Mrs. A, and decrease
the estate taxes of Mr. A both because of the marital deduction and
26. See notes 9-18 supra.
27. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(e) (1954); 2 CCH FED. ESTATE & GIFT TAX REP.
f[ 8003.55.
28. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1015.

29. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §§ 643(a) (3); 642(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.643 (a)
3(a) (1956).
30. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 642 (c).
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
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the charitable deduction. 32 Thus the gift to charity with a retained
life income interest will not be subject to an estate tax, and, indeed,
may well result in a decrease in the amount that would be payable
if an inter-vivos gift were made outright to charity.
5. Non-taxable income.-The trustee will receive $400 per year in
tax exempt interest and will distribute the full amount without an
expense charge to Mr. and Mrs. A. Since trust distributions, unlike
corporate distributions, have the same character in the hands of the
beneficiary as in the hands of the trust,33 Mr. and Mrs. A will have
increased their spendable annual income from $75 ($150 less tax at
50 per cent) to $400, an increase of 533 per cent in after tax annual
income. Also, when their tax savings No. 1-no capital gains tax
($1,250)-is added to their tax savings No. 2-a charitable deduction ($1,819)-their $10,000 joint and survivor life income contract
has cost them actually only $6,931 ($10,000 less $3,069), and their
$400 tax-free income provides an annual net yield on their out-ofpocket cost of 5.77 per cent; this compares quite favorably with their
net after tax yield of 13 per cent on their cost before the transfer.
6. Personal satisfaction.-Mr. and Mrs. A will have the personal
and social satisfaction of having made their gift to the college during
their lifetime and in giving purpose to the ultimate use of their
sum when their needs are no more.
As the advantages of this type of plan became better known, it
was understandable that more charitable institutions began to offer
it and in some instances advertise it. They found very considerably
more interest in the successful accomplishment of their important
fund-raising goals when they had life-income plans to offer prospective donors. That the income can be made tax exempt is not the
result of the gift to charity; instead it is completely the result of the
congressional policy decision on municipal bond interest. When the
latter is added to the charitable deduction, however, the combined
tax consequences of these two separate policy decisions produce the
dramatic tax consequences outlined above. By way of perspective
and judgment, however, it would seem appropriate to point out that
if Mr. and Mrs. A had not made a gift to charity at all, but had sold
their securities, paid a capital gains tax of $1,250, and invested the
remaining $8,750 in the 4 per cent tax exempt bonds, their fund
would be at least $10,500 after five years of accumulation as compared
to the fund of $10,375 that they would have had if they had not sold
their securities but had accumulated their after-tax dividends during
32. INT. REV. CODE

33. INT. REV.
316 (a) (1).

OF 1954, §§ 2056(a), (c) ; 2055.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 652(b), 662(b).

Compare §§ 301(a), (c) (1),
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this period. 34 The important point in this regard is that of the two
congressional tax policy decisions-the charitable deduction and the
exemption of municipal bond interest-the latter has the more far
reaching and long-lasting impact; after only five years of accumulating tax exempt income Mr. and Mrs. A can give an even larger sum
to charity under a tax exempt income plan or not as they please; and
by reinvesting the income, the period would be considerably shorter.
It would seem that the advertising and publicity given to the lifeincome plans offered by the charities should not affect the tax consequences attributable to them. Many investment houses publicize
the tax advantages of municipal bonds generally, the tax loss-carry
over in certain corporate acquisitions, and other transactions in which
tax consequences have the larger economic impact. While it may be
that the emphasis was placed more heavily upon the tax-savings
aspects of these plans than upon their charitable purpose, educational
and other charities currently need mass support-rather than the
occasional big gift-in order to pursue their important purposes
and their use of the techniques of investments houses to present their
plans to the public has not seemed inappropriate. The appeal has
accordingly been made to the average citizen who desires to support
charity but cannot afford to relinquish the income from his capital
during his lifetime. Nevertheless, the Revenue Service became quite
concerned over the increasing popularity of these plans. Several
months ago it was rumored that the Service was considering a ruling
that would, in effect, reverse its prior position35 and deny some of
the tax benefits of the plans. 6 Finally, the Service did rule on
December 5, 1960, in Revenue Ruling 60-370.3 7 The head-note summarizes the ruling as follows:
Where a taxpayer transfers appreciated securities or other property
to a tax-exempt organization, as trustee, which is under an express or
implied obligation to sell such property and invest the proceeds in taxexempt securities, or exchange the transferred property for tax-exempt
34. No account is taken in this example for either (a) the market value
fluctuations of the tax exempt bonds and the securities retained, or (b) the
reinvestment of the annual income. The fact is that when people change

an investment from what has been a growth stock to a tax exempt interest

bond, they have decided upon a different investment purpose.
35. The prior position of the Internal Revenue Service is reflected in
Rev. Rul. 55-275, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 295; Rev. Rul. 57-507, 1957-2 CuM. BuLL.
511; Letter rulings to Pomona College dated March 12, 1958, CCH 1958 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. 1 6807, and Feb. 11, 1959, CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAX REP. I[
6356; Unpublished ruling to Presbyterian Church Foundation, date 2/6/59.

36. An indication that this was being considered was published in the Wall

Street Journal during the fall of 1960. George D. Webster suggested this

as a possibility in 1958. See Webster, Estate Planning Techniques: Charitable

Gifts and Ownership of Foreign Property, 25 TmN. L. REv. 452, 460 (1958);

Penick, IRS Revocation of Approval of Tax-Exempt Pomona Plans Raises
CollateralQuestions, 14 J. TAXATION 102 (1961).
37. 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 49, at 15.
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securities, and to pay the income therefrom to the transferor (and a
secondary beneficiary for life, if any,) with the trustee acquiring a

remainder interest in the trust corpus, the gain from the sale or exchange
of the transferred property by the trustee is
income of the transferor. Tax-exempt income
vestments and distributed by the trustee to the
to the secondary beneficiary retains its exempt

includible in the gross
realized from trust intransferor beneficiary or
status in their hands.

II. TnE PROBLEMS RAISED By REVENUE RULING 60-370
A. The Scope of the Ruling
In the fact situation postulated by the ruling the university, as
trustee, was under an express obligation to sell or exchange the
appreciated property transferred and to purchase tax-exempt securities. From this it was reasoned that "in substance, the transferor
did not give the trustee appreciated property to hold in trust, but
rather, gave the trustee the proceeds of the sale or exchange of the
property which the trustee was required to consummate." 38 Accordingly, it was held that the transferor realizes the gain and that it is
to be included in his gross income in the taxable year that the sale
is made by the university. 39 The ruling goes on to state that while in
the instant case the university, as trustee, was under an express
obligation to sell the appreciated property transferred in trust, an
obligation to sell or exchange may also arise by implication. "For
example, a taxpayer may transfer appreciated property to an educational or charitable organization in reliance upon advertisements or
brochures stating that the organization will sell such property and
invest the proceeds in tax-exempt securities, or exchange the property
'40
for tax-exempt securities.
The ruling strikes deeply at the policy favoring charitable deductions while leaving the policy favoring the exemption of municipal bond interest completely unscathed. It does this by asserting that
a gift of appreciated property is a realization of gross income when
the circumstances are such that the trustee might be considered
under an obligation to sell the gift property, 4' and then only when
the obligation of the trustee is to purchase tax-exempt securities.
Thus it appears that the purpose and scope of the ruling is to
attack only those situations where the agreement between the donor
and the charity is for the purchase of tax exempts. But why, pray tell,
should these parties not be allowed to contemplate and arrange for the
purchase of tax exempts by the trustee as much as any other in38. Rev. Rul. 60-370, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 49, at 15, ninth paragraph.

39. Id., tenth paragraph.
40. Id., thirteenth paragraph.
41. Compare the principle of Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), the
essence of which is quoted at note 18 supra.
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vestor? If tax exempt income is the real concern of the Internal
Revenue Service, should it not be as much or more concerned about
all investments in such securities as about the small amount arranged for by donors to charity? To the extent that an investor
changes from a growth stock to tax exempt interest bond, he has
traded inflation protection for income to spend, a basic change in
investment purpose. This is not a change in purpose which is limited
to donors to charity.
If, on the other hand, the concern of the Service is not limited to
the tax exempt interest element in the life-income trust plans of
charities, a very serious threat is posed to the scope of the present
policy concerning the charitable deduction, in which Revenue Ruling
60-370 would seem to be only the first step. Indeed, it could be even
broader than the charitable deduction. The threat is an extension of
the Horst 42 principle that a gift of appreciated property is a realization of income to the donor. While the basis sections 43 provide an
amelioration as to donees other than charities, if the principle that
a gift of appreciated property is a realization of income is to be
asserted by the Service, it would seem that it would be applicable to
all gifts. Why should the Service be interested only in tax exempt
income trusts? Suppose the parties agree that the trustee will invest the gift in a balanced mutual fund? Suppose the donor expresses
a preference for another investment calculated to produce primarily
income to the beneficiary? Is not the "obligation" of the trustee as
much in one case as in the other? If the Service can say that an
arrangement for investment by the trustee in tax exempts is a
realization, it would seem clear that it can say that an arrangement
for any other type of investment program for the trust results in a
realization of gross income by the donor of appreciated property, and
this seems only a "hair-breadth" away from asserting that every gift
of appreciated property is a realization of income. Published rulings
are issued by the Internal Revenue Service and only important problems or cases are considered by Treasury officials.44 While we are not
advised whether Revenue Ruling 60-370 has been considered by
Treasury, it would seem that the important tax policy changes
implicit in it-realization generally, the scope of the charitable deduction, and the relation of these two items to the policy concerning
tax exempt interest-are broad political tax policy problems for
which the President and the Congress should take the responsibility.
Because the policy issues involved have much broader and more
important significance than the use of life-income arrangements by
42. Ibid.
43. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1015.
44. SuRREY & WAREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 47 (1960 ed.).
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charities to encourage contributions, it seems questionable whether
or not it is a proper function of a revenue ruling to take action to
45
effectuate a change in policies of such scope.
B. The Necessity of an Obligation To Sell and PurchaseTax Exempts
'A careful study of the Ruling makes clear that it limits itself to
situations where the charity is under an obligation (1) to sell the
transferred property and (2) to purchase tax exempts, No doubt
the advertisements of the charitable institutions to encourage this
type of giving led to the drafting of trust instruments in which the
trustee is expressly obligated to sell and invest in tax exempts. It
seems clear that it is the obligation to do these things that will
cause the Service to apply its new principle of realization; and the
Service forewarns that it will not limit its action to trust instruments in which the obligation is expressed; since "it may be necessary to go beyond the trust instrument to determine whether there
is an obligation, either express or implied... no advance rulings will
be issued as to whether there is such an obligation. '46 Instead, the
Service will attempt to determine whether the transfer was made in
reliance upon "advertisement or brochures" from which an obligation
might be inferred.
Does this mean that every gift of appreciated property to a charity
under a life-income trust will result in the realization of income to
the donor in any year in which the trustee invests in tax exempts?
Suppose there is no express obligation to do so? Suppose a bank or
other independent trustee is named? Does this ruling have the
effect of forbidding investments in tax exempts by trustees, at the
threat of imposing a special tax burden on the donors of remainder
interests to charities? It is apparent that the Service wants to stop
charitable institutions from entering into tax-exempt income arrangements as a method of encouraging gifts; and it is rumored that
in the case of any such plan, when the trustee invests in tax exempts,
the Service will assert an implied obligation to do so and try to make
the taxpayer prove otherwise.
Both the industry and the professional counsellors concerned with
trust administration today generally recommend that trustees be
given broad administrative powers, including broad discretion concerning investments. This trend has found expression in recent statutory and court decisional changes from a restricted legal list of
investments for fiduciaries to the broader prudent-man principle,
and the authorization to purchase the shares of an investment trust,
45. Id., at 36-40 'The Legislative Process"; id. at 41-50, "The Administrative
Process."
46. Rev. Rul. 60-370, 1960 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 49, at 15, second from last
paragraph.
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or, indeed, to operate the fiduciary's own common trust fund. 47 Broad
investment powers provide the needed flexibility 48 in managing investments and eliminate the expense of obtaining court permission to
make such changes. The important point is that it is generally regarded as the duty of the trustee to invest trust funds in such a way
as to receive an income without improperly risking the loss of the
principal, thus having due regard for both the interests of the income
beneficiaries and those of the corpus-remainder beneficiaries. 49 Also,
it has been the law of trusts for many years that the powers and
duties of the trustee in making investments, like his other powers
and duties, can be regulated by the terms of the trust instrument.5 0
Under a trust instrument which does not expressly obligate the
trustee to invest in tax exempt bonds it would seem that the Service
will have a difficult time enforcing its new rule of realization in the
courts. In the case of a trust with a high bracket income beneficiary,
it would be a duty of the trustee to consider the purchase of tax
exempt income investments, and this is true regardless of who is the
remainder-corpus beneficiary. As a person grows older and plans
for his retirement, it is normal and prudent for the emphasis of his
investment program to change from growth securities to those which
provide spendable income, and this is all the more true if he is
already in a higher income bracket. Accordingly, a trustee in this
situation would indeed be prudent to invest all, or the larger part,
of the trust principal in tax exempt securities, and thus perform
its basic investment duty to invest in a way to receive income
without improperly risking the loss of the corpus, and by having
due regard for both the interests of the income beneficiary and the
corpus-remainderman.
It would appear therefore that the obligation to sell the donated
property and to purchase tax exempts which is made the basis for
an assertion by the Service of a new and special tax burden on the
donor to charity might well be the very obligation of fiduciary administration which the state law of trusts would impose upon the
trustee under the circumstances involved. Under existing economic
conditions and tax policies a trustee under such circumstances who
did not consider thoroughly the desirability of investing in tax
47. See for example the amendment of Tennessee's legal list statute [TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-301 to -311 (1956)] by the addition in 1951 of the prudent
man rule [TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-319 to -325 (1956)] and the enactment in
1953 of the Uniform Common Trust Funds Act [TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-401
.to -405 (1956)]. See 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 227 to 227.16 (1956); Stevenson, Why
The Prudent Man?, 7 VAND. L. REV. 74 (1953).

48. There is an old investment "yarn" that the dinosaur is not around much
anymore because he couldn't turn around quickly enough.
49. 3 SCOTT, TRuSTS § 227 (1956).
50. Id. § 227.14.
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exempts might well be criticized for a breach of fiduciary responsibility. It seems unlikely therefore that the Service will be successful
in the courts in asserting its new rule that a gift of appreciated
property is a realization of income when the trustee, fulfilling its
obligation to exercise prudence, decides to invest in tax exempts.
The Internal Revenue Service certainly has no authority to forbid
a trustee to make an appropriate trust investment, and there would
seem to be no rational basis for imposing or asserting a special tax
burden in this case under existing tax policies.
C. Can This Ruling Be Based upon Sections 677(a) and 671?
Section 677 (a) provides that the grantor-donor of a trust shall be
treated as the owner of any portion of a trust whose income is or
may be distributed to the grantor. Section 671 and the Treasury
Regulations construing it provide that if a grantor is treated as the
owner of any portion of a trust, he takes into account in computing
his income tax liability those items of income, deduction and credit,
including capital gains and losses, attributable to his portion, as if
the trust had not been in existence during the period he is treated as
the owner of it.51 Can Revenue Ruling 60-370 be sustained on the
basis of these two sections of the Code? The key words in section
677 (a) are "any portion." If the transferor should be treated as the
owner of the entire trust because he is the recipient of the entire
"income" as defined by the state law of trusts, then the gain on the
sale of the transferred property would indeed be taxable gain to him,
and this would be so entirely apart from any obligation of the trustee
to sell the property or to buy tax exempt securities. The transferor
is not the owner of the entire trust, however; he has given the remainder interest away, so that he is the owner of only the life-income
interest. Upon analogy it might be argued that since the remainder
interest of a trust with a retained life estate is included in the donor's
gross estate for purposes of the estate tax, with a credit allowed for
the gift tax paid, the transferor who receives the entire income ought
also to be treated as the owner of the entire trust for purposes of the
income tax, notwithstanding a gift tax paid, or an income tax deduction, if the remainder is given to charity; and, it might be argued,
this is consistent with the inclusion in the donor's gross estate of the
date of death value of the remainder interest, which will include
capital gains realized by the trustee upon the sale of trust assets. This
argument assumes that the estate tax treatment is sound, even though
inconsistent with the state law of trusts, and it raises in sharp focus
51. Treas. Reg. f1 1.671-3(a) (1) (1956).
(b) (1), (c) (1956).

See. also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.671-a
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another of the many instances where there is a lack of synthesis in
the technical detail of the three separate taxes-income, gift, and
estate-with respect to inter vivos trusts. The income and gift taxes
have followed the state law of trusts in this instance, and by giving a
credit for the gift tax paid, even the estate tax approximates this
result. Accordingly, for purposes of the income tax the transferor is
not treated as the owner of the entire trust, but, rather, as the owner
of only the life income interest as defined by the state law of trusts.
The Treasury regulations provide in this situation that the grantor
should not include the capital gain realized upon sale by the trustee
because52 "that is not attributable to the portion of the trust that he
owns.11

Because of the above Treasury interpretation of sections 677 (a)
and 671 the Internal Revenue Service puts its emphasis in Revenue
Ruling 60-370 on the obligation of the trustee and on the argument
that the sale was in effect a sale by the transferor, and a realization
of the gain by the transferor. Such an argument on realization also
would be necessary to the Service in cases where the trust instrument directed the income to be distributed to someone other than
the grantor. How far does this argument go? Suppose a sole proprietorship with appreciated inventory incorporates. Clearly it is
expected that the inventory will be sold. Does this mean the pro53
prietor must recognize the income? Presumably not.
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-l(g), Ex. (1) (1956); § 1.671-3(b)(1), (c)
(195b). See also § 1.642(c)-3 (1956). That profits on the sale of trust assets
are generally allocated to the corpus-remainder beneficiary under state law,
absent a contrary provision in the trust instrument, see 3 SCOTT, TRusTs § 233.1
(2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUsTs § 233 (1959). For the estate tax
treatment, see IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2031, 2012. For the gift tax
treatment, see Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318
U.S. 176 (1943); Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
53. See comment by Stanley S. Surrey on Revenue Ruling 60-370, SURREY &
WARREN, FEDERAL TAXATION, CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE ff 1115, at 701 (1961).

Also, in TIR 303, issued February 9, 1961, the Service announced that
there will be no more advance rulings on the taxability or non-taxability
of an exchange of appreciated securities for the stock of a newly formed
investment company. CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 6311. Rev. Rul. 54-

172, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 394 and Rev. Proc. 60-6, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 880 will
be amended to include in the area in which rulings will not be issued the
following:
"Section 351.-Whether the transfer of appreciated stocks or securities
to a newly organized investment company in exchange for shares of the
stock of such investment company, as a result of solicitation by promoters, brokers or investment houses, will constitute nontaxable exchanges
within the meaning of this section."
There is no stated reason for this position and no apparent one, except
for the fact that the Service does not like to make repeated admissions of
the nontaxability of transactions. For about one year, mutual investment
companies have advertised the nontaxability of security exchanges in situations like the kind on which there will be no further advance rulings. See
Taxes on Parade, No. 14, Feb. 15, 1961, CCH 1961

STAND.

FED. TAX REP.
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III. TYPEs OF LiFE INCOME ARRANGEMENTS OFFERED By C

uA
IS

By its terms Revenue Ruling 60-370 does not apply to life income
arrangements offered by charities where there is no obligation to
invest in tax exempts. Accordingly, the prior established policy
which holds that a gift of appreciated property is not a realization of
income, and that the donor is entitled to a charitable deduction for

the present value of the future remainder interest 5 4 is not changed

with respect to other life income arrangements. In order to formulate a perspective on the probable impact and significance of the
Ruling, it might be helpful to consider briefly the other types of

life-income arrangements currently available to donors from charities.
There seem to be three basic types of charitable gift agreements
which have been calculated to preserve or increase the spendable
income of the donor for life, or for joint and survivor lives.55 They
are (A) the gift-annuity, (B) the life-income contract, and (C) the
retained life-estate in trust.

A. The Gift-annuity
A gift-annuity from a charitable institution may be defined as a

gift to the charity subject to an agreement by the institution to pay
a fixed dollar sum to the annuitant. The amount of the transfer to
the institution may be considered as the sum of two parts: (1) a
donation to its charitable work, plus (2) a single premium for a life
annuity. It is the oldest life-income arrangement and, apparently
because it has been in use for several generations, it still represents
54. See note 35 supra. See also notes 9-16 supra. There is indication, however, that the Service has taken under review certain related aspects of
gifts of remainder interests to charitable or educational institutions. For
example, Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960 INT. Rav. BULL. NO. 52, at 15, revoked Rev.
Rul. 55-620, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 56 and holds that where there is a gift to
charity in trust with a retained life interest and the trust instrument provides that corpus may be invested in the stock of regulated investment companies, if the trust instrument provides that capital gains realized by such
companies shall be treated as corpus, the charitable deduction shall be
allowed to the donor. If the trust instrument provides that gains realized
may be treated as income, however, then the charitable interest is not
severable from the non-charitable interest, and therefore no deduction
for income, estate and gift tax purposes shall be allowed. This seems to
be a sound ruling.
55. It is sometimes said that there are two types of plans, namely, "Annuity Plans" and "Life Income Plans." Moorhead, Annuity and Life Income Plans Offered by Charitable Organizations, 10 J.Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 157
(1956); Note, Gift Annuities and Life Income Contracts Issued By Charitable
Organizations Under the Federal Income Tax Laws, 1957 WAsH. U.L.Q. 150.
Because there are two types of life income plans, in one of which the
gift property is mingled with the endowment funds of the charity and the
donor's income rights are purely contractual, and in the other the gift
property constitutes a separate trust fund so that the donor's interest
constitutes an equitable life estate in property, it has seemed preferable to
distinguish them as three plans.
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the largest number of income arrangements in effect. A very recent
survey of nineteen educational institutions conducted by the American
Council on Education indicates that the first annuity gift received
by the participants was accepted as far back as 1878, that as recently as 1959 six of the reporting institutions had no annuity contracts, and that there were a total of 304 funds representing
$12,837,375, of which one institution had 158 separate funds with a
market value of $1,355,490. The survey further indicates that the
average number of annuity gifts at all reporting institutions is 11
and that the average gift approximates $42,250. Excluding one institution, the average value of the annuities reserved as compared to
the value of the property transferred varied from a low of 2 per
cent to a high of 50 per cent.
When a gift is made to a charity subject to an annuity, the amount
of the charitable deduction is the difference between the sum transferred and the present value of the annuitant's right to receive payments, such value to be computed with the factors used by reputable
commercial life insurance companies. 56 For example, if a donorannuitant-male age fifty paid $1,000 to a charitable organization for a
4 per cent life annuity, the amount donated to the charity would be
$199.36 and the cost of the annuity contract would be $800.64.57 Since
the $40 payments received by the donor will be taxed as an annuity,
there is excluded that portion of the $40 received each year which
the total cost ($800.64) bears to the expected return ($1,020); thus
$31.20 is excluded and $8.80 is taxed as ordinary income each year. If,
however, the donor transfers appreciated property having a market
value of $1,000, the transaction also results in the realization of
a capital gain taxable to the extent that the present value of the
annuity exceeds the taxpayer's basis for the property. 58 This will
be handled as a private annuity, so that the taxpayer's basis is
recovered first from the annual amount ($31.20) excluded, after which
this amount is taxed as capital gain for a sufficient number of years
to equal the total capital gain realized; thereafter the amount equal
to the exclusion ratio will not be taxed.
A number of charitable institutions have found that "gift annuities
can be millstones rather than life-preservers. 5 9 There are several
factors contributing to the danger that charitable organizations which
56. Letter Ruling dated September 9, 1955, 4 P-H 1956 FED. TAX SErv.

76,312.

57. Ibid. This example is used in the Letter Ruling.
58. Ibid. See also McGiveran & Lynch, Private Annuities, 13 J. AM. Soc'y
C.L.U. 14, 22 (1958).
59. Weld, Donors' Annuities and College Security, 30 A. OF Am. COLLEGES
BULL. 539 (1944) cited in Note, Gift Annuities and Life Income Contracts
Issued by Charitable OrganizationsUnder the Federal Income Tax Laws, 1957
WASH. U.L.Q. 150, 159.
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grant annuities might conceivably find it necessary to divert other
charitable assets to meet annuity obligations. When a charitable
organization binds itself to pay an annuitant a fixed annual sum
during his life, it is taking the risk that the annuitant might live
long enough to exhaust the principal and income which the charitable
organization received. This could hazard the charity's tax exempt
status. There are also problems concerning the spread of their risk
over too small a number of lives, merging annuity funds with general
funds, and concern over proper annuity accounting practices and
the applicability of state law concerning the maintenance of reserves.
The activities of the average institution in connection with the administration of such gifts are at best a bare minimum. The recent
survey of the American Council on Education indicates that there
is frequently no formal plan for receiving or processing gifts subject
to an annuity. Instead, such gifts are accepted only when the age of
the beneficiary, the amount of the gift and the agreed annuity payment are such that the fund will remain intact and be available for
charitable purposes within a relatively short period.
From the standpoint of both the donor and the charitable institution either of the life income arrangements discussed below will
ordinarily be preferable. The annuity contract results in a capital
gain taxable to the donor, and, unless care is taken, it could conceivably endanger the tax-exempt status of the charity, and confront
it with state regulation concerning the accounting and legal reserve
requirements of commercial insurance companies.
B. The Life-Income Contract
This is an arrangement under the terms of which the charity
accepts either a principal sum or property at market value and
agrees to invest it with the organization's general endowment funds.
The charitable organization pays to the donor, or his appointee, an
income for life, determined by the average yield on the organization's
general endowment funds. Because there is a tendency among charities to fail to distinguish between the life income contract and the
retained life estate in trust, there was substantial difference in the
replies to the questionnaire of the American Council on Education
concerning (1) the commingling of these gifts with the charity's own
general endowment as compared to maintaining separate funds for
each gift, (2) whether or not a trust is created under local law, and
(3) whether or not a private individual might be said to own a fractional interest in the charity's general endowment funds. It would
seem clear, however, that in a life income contract, as distinguished
from a retained life estate in trust, the charity may commingle
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and the donor owns no estate or property right in the assets of
the charity. Instead, the donor owns an in personam contract right
to receive an income equal to the average yield on the general endowment funds.
The donor under the life income contract is entitled to a charitable
deduction for the present value of the legal remainder interest given
to the charity, and under this arrangement there should be no problem about qualifying the gift for the additional 10 per cent allowed
by Code section 170 (b) (1) (A) because the gift is "to" the charity
and not in trust "for the use of" the charity. Differently from the
gift annuity, the entire income of the life income contract seems to
represent taxable income to the recipient. When appreciated property
is transferred, it has not been treated in the past as a realization of
gain. While the gift annuity pays a fixed dollar amount, and the life
income contract pays a variable amount, this difference would not
seem to be sufficient to justify a distinction upon the question of
realization.
Differently from the retained life estate in trust, it would not seem
possible to arrange for the receipt of tax exempt income under a
true life income contract. The rights of the beneficiary would be
purely in personam against the charity to receive an income payment
equal to the average yield on its general endowment. The trust rules
would not apply, and it would seem neither feasible nor desirable
to apportion the amount paid each year into interest, dividends, rent,
etc., in proportion to the total of each category comprising the
charity's total income.
Under this type of arrangement the donor will receive a higher
yield than on the gift-annuity. Because of the commingling of the
gift with general endowment funds, the amount received annually
seems closer to a corporate dividend than a trust distribution, and
therefore fully taxable; and for a like reason, the question of realization of capital gain seems to be closer to that in the case of the
gift-annuity than it is to that in the case of the retention of a life
estate in a trust fund. This plan has been the easiest for the charity
to administer, however, because it can commingle the funds and not
be concerned with problems of fiduciary administration. There is
rumor, however, that the Internal Revenue Service is considering a
suggestion that the common investment of life income gifts by charities constitutes an association taxable as a corporation. Whether or
not this is limited to life income contracts of the type discussed here
is not clear. All of these factors considered, however, it seems clear
that the trust concept discussed below is the more clear, desirable and
safer to both the donor and the charity.
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C. The Retained Life Estate in Trust
While administrators of charities apparently do not always distinguish this arrangement from the life income contract, upon analysis there is in fact very little similarity between the two. The donor
transfers cash or property to a trustee who holds the legal title to
the assets in trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries, who are said
to own the equitable title to the trust assets. The remainder interest
can be either equitable or legal, and, as indicated early in this paper,
care should be taken to make the remainder legal in order to qualify
for the additional 10 per cent charitable deduction. Under this arrangement it is a breach of its fiduciary duty as trustee for the
charity to commingle the trust funds with its own general endowment funds; 60 it is the duty of a trustee to keep the trust property
separate from other property and to properly designate it as the
property of the trust.
The income tax consequences of trust distributions to beneficiaries
are very different from those in either the gift-annuity or the in
personam life income contract. The most important difference with
respect to the trust beneficiary is that the income distributed to him
each year has the same character in his hands as in the hands of the
trustee. Accordingly, the beneficiary's trust income consists proportionately of dividends, rent, interest, and tax-exempt interest in
proportion as each class bears to the total trust income. The charity
as a trustee is required to file a fiduciary income tax return even
though it has paid out all the income. The powers and duties of
the trustee in making investments, like his other powers and duties,
61
can be regulated by the terms of the trust.
D. ComparativeAnalysis
Charitable institutions prefer outright gifts to gifts with a reservation of income. The recent survey by the American Council on
Education indicated that for the last fiscal year gift annuities
amounted to less than one per cent of the total value of gifts received by the reporting institutions, and life income arrangements
amounted to less than seven per cent of total gifts received. Life
income plans are simply an additional method for encouraging gifts
and increasing the general endowment funds of the institutions.
The charities also recognize that the life income plans enable donors
of modest means to make larger gifts than would have been possible
by the outright gift method.
The retained life estate in trust in which the trustee is directed to
60. 2 ScoTT, TausTs §§ 179-179.3 (2d ed. 1956).
61. Id., § 227.14.
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invest in tax-exempt securities would seem to be by far the most
attractive arrangement. This is probably true even though the remainder beneficiary is a taxable individual beneficiary and the trustee
is an independent one. It is particularly helpful to charities in encouraging gifts, however, because it appeals to both the modest giver
as well as the more affluent one. Because of its broader appeal and
somewhat more dramatic tax advantages, due entirely to the Congressional tax policy decision on municipal bond interest, this plan
was given wide publicity in nationally circulated publications and
brochures. It no doubt came to represent some competition to the
life insurance agent in approaching an investor who might be in a
position to purchase a substantial annuity from a life insurance company. Further, if the rumor that the Service is considering the possibility of taxing the common investment of life income gifts as an
association taxable as a corporation could possibly be applied to
these separately held trust funds, which seems most unlikely, it
would require the transfer of the trusts to an independent trustee,
probably a corporate fiduciary. It is conceivable that both the life
insurance industry and the trust division of the banking industry
have experienced some competition from life income arrangements
offered by charities. It is believed, however, that such competition
as may exist is not substantial enough to be significant, and this
is particularly true in the case of the independent fiduciary.
If it is valid, Revenue Ruling 60-370 will destroy the best "salesleader" for advertising that charities have ever had. It will effectively
frustrate an important method of giving on the part of older individuals who are desirous of making gifts to educational institutions
before they die. Because of this it is indeed significant that President
Kennedy's Special Task Force Committee on Education has recommended that this Ruling be withdrawn in order to encourage contributions to educational institutions. The Committee believes that
rescission of the ruling will demonstrate to colleges and universities
and to philanthropically inclined individuals that the Kennedy Administration is anxious to do all in its power to stimulate private
giving in support of educational institutions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Revenue Ruling 60-370 singles out donors to charity for the assertion of a new rule on realization-that a gift of appreciated property
is a realization of gain. This is a proposition which consistently has
63
been rejected by the courts,6 and upon analogy by the Congress.
62. See note 14 supra.
63. See note 13 supra.
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The new realization rule will be applied, however, only to those
donors to charity who make their gifts in the form of a trust in
which the trustee is directed to invest in tax exempts. But the
Congress has made the tax policy decision to exclude the interest on
state and local bonds, and it has put no limitations on when, or in
whose hands, such interest is excluded. Further, the Ruling is inconsistent with other rules on realization of income expressed in the
Code, Treasury Regulations, and court decisions.
It is believed that Revenue Ruling 60-370 will not be sustained as a
proper interpretation of the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue
Code. Unfortunately, its very existence will irreparably damage and
retard the efforts of charities to attract donors who might not otherwise be interested in making lifetime gifts to charity. It is further
believed that the recommendations of the Special Task Force Committee on Education should be adopted by the President, and action
taken through the Secretary of the Treasury to request the Internal
Revenue Service to revoke the Ruling. The extent to which the
work of educational and other charitable institutions should be
either encouraged or limited by a tax deduction, and the proper
relation of this deduction to the exclusion of municipal bond interest are important tax policy problems for the changing of which
the President and the Congress have the political responsibility. It
does not seem reasonably within the scope of interpretation of the
law to assert a new and special rule on realization which effectively
changes existing tax policy.
This is not to say that the exemption of state and local bond interest should be continued, or that the principle of the Horst6 4 case
should not be extended to gifts of property which have appreciated
in value. Rather, it is to say that until the Congress and the President make those changes after due consideration and for general
application, it does not seem appropriate for the Internal Revenue
Service to do this in a narrow, inconsistent, isolated situation, which,
nevertheless, is of tremendous importance to the welfare of our society.
64. See notes 11, 18 supra.

